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The Judicialization of Politics 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF 
ELECTION LAW PROJECT 
Steven F. Huefner† & Edward B. Foley†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Our contribution to this symposium reflects almost a 
decade of collaborative work thinking about the general topic of 
election law and its improvement. In the specific context of this 
symposium’s focus on the role of the American Law Institute 
(ALI), our academic work could perhaps be characterized as an 
effort at a “reformulation” of certain aspects of election law, 
though not a “restatement.” Specifically, much of our recent 
work has focused on strengthening the processes of election 
administration, from voter registration to the resolution of post-
election disputes.1 
However, one feature of the field of election law has 
greatly complicated our efforts—as well as the efforts of 
numerous other practitioners, legislators, and academics—to 
enhance these foundational processes of representative 
democracy. That feature is the uniquely politically charged nature 
of election law. As we will describe in more detail below,2 this 
political valance renders many issues of election administration 
highly resistant to neutral solutions. In particular, the fact that 
election law is in an important sense the “meta-law” of 
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 1 See, e.g., STEVEN F. HUEFNER, EDWARD B. FOLEY & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, 
FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN 
STATES (2007); STEVEN F. HUEFNER, NATHAN A. CEMENSKA, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & 
EDWARD B. FOLEY, FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES (2011). 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 6-30. 
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representative democracy means that more is often at stake in 
battles over how to structure this field of law than in battles 
over principles in other fields of law. Partly as a result, for 
most of our country’s history, courts have treated many of these 
issues of election law as political questions not suited for 
judicial supervision. 
Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that until 2010, 
the ALI had not undertaken any projects focused on election 
law. But that year, almost 50 years after Baker v. Carr3 and a 
decade after Bush v. Gore,4 the ALI decided to explore whether 
at least some areas of election law were amenable to the 
formulation or reformulation of neutral (or impartial) principles. 
Two areas in particular rapidly emerged as fruitful areas for the 
ALI’s initial consideration: The ideal institutions and processes 
for resolving election disputes, and the best practices for states 
to deploy in connection with the recent widespread adoption of 
non-precinct voting. 
As we describe in this article, the ALI’s Principles of 
Election Law Project is a clear example of the ALI tackling a new 
and perhaps difficult field. In the discussion to follow, we will 
elaborate on the main challenges and opportunities that this 
project presents. We will begin in Part I with a brief overview of 
what we view as some of the unique features of election law as a 
field of American law. In light of these features, Part II then will 
discuss the Project’s work on the subject of resolving disputed 
elections. Next, Part III will turn to a consideration of the 
Project’s work to develop best practices concerning non-precinct 
voting. Finally, Part IV will offer a few concluding thoughts 
about both the work already done and the work ahead for the 
ALI Principles of Election Law Project. 
I. THE UNIQUENESS OF ELECTION LAW 
As a field of American law, election law is unique. Unlike 
other laws, election law sets the conditions under which all the 
other democratic decisions about the structure of government 
and society will be made. Questions concerning election law and 
process therefore can be the most hotly contested of issues. In 
addition, and no doubt substantially as a result of these heavy 
political overtones, many matters of election law have 
historically been treated as political questions not amenable to 
 
 3 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 4 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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judicial supervision. Nevertheless, the time is ripe for an ALI 
effort with respect to select matters of election law. 
A. Election Law as “Meta-Law” 
In all representative democracies, elections determine 
who will make government policy. Election law thus functions 
as a sort of meta-law by setting the conditions for selecting 
those government officials who will determine society’s other 
legal rules.5 Establishing the “rules of the game,” therefore, can 
be critical to the results of the game, or, in other words, to the 
eventual outputs of the political process. 
It thus is not surprising that politicians and political 
parties often argue vigorously over such basic structural 
questions as whether to permit Election Day registration, who 
should draw legislative district boundaries, what identification 
voters must present at the polling place, or how many days or 
hours to allow early or absentee voting.6 Nevertheless, it can be 
discouraging that these fundamental issues about process are 
often resolved by partisans, and primarily on the basis of the 
anticipated effects on partisan interests or desired policy 
outcomes, rather than by neutral arbiters based on essential 
notions of representational fairness and democratic participation. 
Ideally, these questions of the meta-law of representative 
democracy should be decided behind a veil of ignorance, without 
awareness of their resulting impact on other fields of law and 
policy. We should structure the best electoral processes we can and 
let the chips, in terms of electoral (and policy) outcomes, fall where 
they may. But, in fact, these choices about the meta-law typically 
are made with full awareness of their likely impacts, and by 
individuals who deliberately seek to capitalize on these impacts. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right Is “The Right to Vote”?, 93 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 45 (2007) (describing right to vote as “the foundational right of 
democratic self-governance”); Adam Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 
VA. L. REV. 361, 362 (2007) (noting accepted view that right to vote is important 
because of opportunity to affect political process); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
370 (1886) (describing right to vote as “preservative of all rights”); cf. JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-88 (1980) (describing importance of fair political process, 
through which society’s fundamental value choices can be made); LOUIS MASSICOTTE ET 
AL., ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES (2004) 
(comparing key features of election laws in democracies around the world). 
 6 See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO 
THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (describing many contemporary political battles 
concerning the law of politics); WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, VOTING LAW 
CHANGES IN 2012, at 2-3 (2011) (describing recent state legislative battles over many of 
these issues), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
Democracy/VRE/Brennan_Voting_Law_V10.pdf. 
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Moreover, it can be especially troubling, and in a way 
that may not be true in other fields of law,7 when the judiciary 
resolves an election law controversy with a split decision along 
ideological lines. Here too, given election law’s character as 
meta-law, we might hope that a fair result—independent of 
specific political outcome—ought to be universally or at least 
widely agreed upon by fair-minded individuals or institutions. 
Courts in particular are presumed to function as neutral 
arbiters of fairness. So when judges themselves are deeply 
divided along ideological lines over matters of election law,8 the 
difficulty of identifying, or at least agreeing upon, neutral 
principles becomes apparent. 
B. Election Law and the Political Question Doctrine 
The difficulty that even fair-minded jurists can have in 
resolving an election law issue provides arguable justification 
for the reluctance that courts traditionally have shown when 
asked to intervene in certain aspects of the law of the political 
process. Historically, such central election issues as how district 
lines were drawn or who was the victor of a contested election 
have been treated as “political questions” to be resolved by the 
political branches of government.9 Under the political question 
doctrine, American courts have left many aspects of election law 
unexamined and unsupervised for most of the country’s 
history.10 While this article is not the place to examine the full 
history of the deployment of the political question doctrine to 
avoid judicial incursions into election law, a few observations 
may be relevant. 
 
 7 For instance, when an issue of tort law divides a high court on apparently 
ideological grounds, observers may justifiably be concerned that politics is influencing 
the court and compromising our aspirations for neutral adjudication in that field. But 
that is a different concern than the sense, which may well accompany split judicial 
decisions concerning questions of the law of the political process, that the entire 
political process is not subject to neutral oversight. See Edward B. Foley, The 
Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (2013). 
 8 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (5-4 decision 
striking down portion of Voting Rights Act); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (5-4 
decision determining 2000 presidential election); see generally Foley, The Separation of 
Electoral Powers, supra note 7, at 143-44; HASEN, supra note 6; Jack Balkin, Bush v. 
Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L. J. 1407 (2001). 
 9 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
 10 For one account of the increasing role federal courts have recently played 
in matters of election law, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION 
LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003); see also Rachel 
E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and 
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002). 
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The Founders were already quite experienced with 
legislative elections when they created American democracy.11 
Perhaps because elections were familiar, the Founders did not 
give much thought to how to structure them.12 Furthermore, 
legislatures were expected to be the judges of the elections of 
their own members.13 Accordingly, even though election 
controversies have occasionally dogged democracy from the 
beginning,14 the Founders likely did not anticipate that courts 
would come to play a significant role in overseeing elections.15 
Instead, in the country’s formative years, election controversies 
played out in legislatures, in election canvassing commissions, 
or even in the streets—but not ordinarily in the courts.16 
Over the years, opportunities and pressures for judicial 
involvement in election matters have grown. The fitful moves 
toward near-universal suffrage, the adoption of the secret ballot, 
and the country’s significant population growth and accompanying 
urbanization all contributed much greater complexity to our voting 
processes.17 The arrival of new technologies designed to improve 
the mechanics of voting has only compounded this complexity. 
Meanwhile, the entrenchment of a two-party political dynamic, not 
 
 11 Most of the founding fathers were elected members of their respective 
colonial congresses. For instance, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Richard 
Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, and Peyton Randolph were elected to the House of 
Burgesses in Virginia; John Adams and Samuel Adams were elected to the 
Massachusetts Assembly; Benjamin Franklin and John Dickinson were elected to the 
Pennsylvania Assembly. See America’s Founding Fathers: Delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/
constitution_founding_fathers.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 12 The only Federalist paper directly to address colonial elections does little to 
elaborate on these elections, other than to state that the example of these elections “is so 
well known as to require little to be said on it.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison). 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 14 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore: The 1792 Election 
Dispute and Its Continuing Relevance, 44 IND. L. REV. 23 (2010) (describing late 
eighteenth century dispute over outcome of New York gubernatorial election). 
 15 Moreover, in the late eighteenth century courts were generally less 
involved in supervising the activities of a much smaller government, and before the 
Civil War the role of the federal courts in particular was inherently limited by 
federalism. As of 1900 (shortly before the founding of the American Law Institute), the 
settled law was that federal courts would not supervise state electoral processes. See, 
e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 580 (1900) (“The Commonwealth of Kentucky is 
in full possession of its faculties as a member of the Union, and no exigency has arisen 
requiring the interference of the General Government to enforce the guarantees of the 
Constitution, or to repel invasion, or to put down domestic violence.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 14, at 30-51. 
 17 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED 
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
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anticipated by the Founders, added an ongoing partisan overlay to 
the country’s electoral processes.18 
Yet until 1962, the courts continued to play a limited role in 
supervising these increasingly complex processes. The Supreme 
Court’s decision that year in Baker v. Carr19 was a watershed 
event, introducing courts deeply into the “political thicket” that 
Justice Frankfurter had warned the Court to avoid just 16 years 
earlier.20 Baker v. Carr, of course, opened the floodgates for judicial 
review of the drawing of legislative district lines under the equal 
protection clause. Ensuing cases firmly established the principle of 
one person, one vote, and the requirement that legislative districts 
therefore contain equal populations.21 
Still, courts played relatively little role in the supervision 
of the day-to-day administration of election mechanics,22 so much 
so that in 2000 most observers anticipated that the Supreme 
Court would not have a basis for reviewing the results of 
Florida’s razor-thin and contested voting in that year’s 
presidential election.23 Many observers instead anticipated 
that, under the Electoral Count Act and Article II and 
Amendment XII of the Constitution, Congress would determine 
the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.24 Indeed, the 
settled law with respect to Congressional elections, as was also 
true of many state legislatures, was that Congress was the 
ultimate judge of the elections of its members.25 
The Court’s surprising deployment of a new instantiation 
of the equal protection doctrine in Bush v. Gore26 represented 
another watershed for judicial involvement in matters of election 
 
 18 See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 14, at 25, 27-28; see also 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 5-6 (2005); RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 53 (1969). 
 19 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 20 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 21 See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 22 See generally Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, 
and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865 (2013). 
 23 See Laurence Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore 
from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 299 (2001); see also Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of 
Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2001). 
 24 See Tribe, supra note 23, at 275-92; Adam Clymer, The 2000 Election: The 
Timetable; President Could Be Picked Without Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A30; 
Stephen Gillers, Who Says the Election Has a Dec. 12 Deadline?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2. 2000, 
at A19; Sean Scully & Audrey Hudson, House Leadership Quietly Prepares to Choose a 
President; Congress Studies Constitutional Role, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 04, 2000, at A10. 
 25 See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972); Steven F. Huefner, 
Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265, 321-22 (2007). 
 26 531 U.S. 98, 104-09 (2000) (per curiam). 
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administration.27 The full impact of this decision on the field of 
election law remains unsettled (notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s own apparent effort to limit the decision’s precedential 
impact28). Depending on how broadly the decision is deployed in 
the future, the effects could be substantial.29 The decision is already 
featured in several appellate court decisions examining various 
state election practices under the equal protection doctrine,30 and 
eventually could be used to review a host of local variations in how 
elections are conducted within a particular state. 
C. Contemporary Interest in Matters of Election Law and 
Administration 
Beyond the impact of the decision in Bush v. Gore, the 
2000 election also marked a watershed event because of the 
newfound attention it brought to election processes. As a 
result, state and federal courts have now been asked to become 
deeply involved in many matters of election administration.31 
Moreover, in the past decade, Congress and most state 
legislatures have adopted a variety of new laws governing the 
conduct of elections.32 
The dramatic increase in judicial and legislative 
attention, however, has not necessarily produced greater fairness 
in our electoral processes. Instead, legislators remain under 
 
 27 David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Equal Rights Surprise Basis for this 
Court, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2000, at A8; Margaret Warner, Bush v. 
Gore: Legal Scholars Examine the Arguments Before the Supreme Court that Could 
Decide the Presidency, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR (Dec. 11, 2000), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/election/july-dec00/legal_12-11.html. 
 28 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (“[o]ur consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances”). 
 29 See Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 925, 929-30 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal 
Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 391 (2001); Daniel H. 
Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1027-32 (2007). 
 30 See, e.g., Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 428-36 (6th Cir. 
2012); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 591-97 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 234-38 (6th Cir. 2011); 
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 476-78 (6th Cir. 2008); Sw. 
Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 894-901 (9th Cir. 2003); see 
Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, supra note 29. 
 31 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. 
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 
957-59 (2005); see also Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, supra note 29. 
 32 See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 6 (chronicling the substantial changes in 
election laws since 2000); WEISER & NORDEN, supra note 6 (summarizing most recent 
set of election law changes); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election 
Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 693-701 (2006) (describing 
election reform efforts in aftermath of 2000 election). 
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immense pressure to enact meta-laws that will favor their party.33 
Moreover, elected officials can frequently be swayed by their own 
electoral experience. They understandably feel that they know 
first-hand how to reform the electoral process, regardless of what 
empirical analysis and more rigorous attention to systematic 
planning and design would recommend. Meanwhile, judges and 
courts have often not fared much better in identifying neutral 
principles to resolve matters brought before them. And local 
political cultures inevitably complicate the prospects for 
developing widely accepted principles of neutral election 
administration. 
Into this setting, the ALI introduced its Principles of 
Election Law Project in 2010.34 This move reflected a cautious but 
deliberate decision to explore a field that, because of its political 
valence, the ALI had previously left unexplored. But a decade after 
Bush v. Gore, and in light of the continuing efforts to revise 
electoral practices around the country,35 the time seemed ripe to 
see whether individuals and groups from across the political 
spectrum could collaborate in good faith to identify neutral law 
reforms for at least some aspects of twenty-first century 
election administration.36 
In undertaking the Project, the ALI sought to focus on 
those areas where no candidate or political party was likely to 
have a settled view ex ante about the procedures and institutions 
that would best serve a partisan or parochial interest. Post-
election dispute resolution processes seemed to be one candidate 
for consideration. Before Election Day, neither party knows 
 
 33 Cf. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 
139, 141-43 (2013) (describing problem of partisanship in adoption of election laws). 
 34 See ALI Council Approves New Project on Election Law, 33 A.L.I. REP. 1, 4 
(Fall 2010), available at http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/fall2010/default.htm. 
 35 Among some observers there also was a sense that perhaps other 
democracies growing out of the British tradition—particularly Canada, Australia, and 
Britain itself—were doing a better job administering elections fairly and 
independently. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral 
Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425, 425-27 (2006); Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The 
Administration of Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 
406, 406-08 (2004); Kenneth R. Mayer, Comparative Election Administration: Can We 
Learn Anything from the Australian Electoral Commission? (Aug. 30, 2007) 
(unpublished remarks prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association), available at http://works.bepress.com/mayer/17. 
 36 Commencement of the ALI project followed closely on the heels of the 
Uniform Law Commission’s successful effort from 2008 to 2010 to produce the Uniform 
Military and Overseas Voters Act, a project targeted at improving the voting options 
and experience of military and overseas voters. See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT 1-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/military%20and%20overseas%20voters/umova
_final_10.pdf. Professor Huefner served as the Reporter on this ULC project as well. 
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whether it will be ahead or behind (and thus does not know 
whether it would benefit from more lenient or stricter ballot-
counting rules and procedures). Similarly, the development of 
best practices for implementing expanded voting opportunities 
beyond precinct-based voting on Election Day seemed to be 
another worthwhile area of focus. Here, the terrain was new 
enough that the parties might not yet have developed settled 
views. But many other questions, including highly controversial 
topics such as voter identification requirements, redistricting 
practices, campaign finance regulations, or even the advisability 
of electronic voting methods, were not included in the Project 
because they did not seem to lend themselves to the development 
of a broad consensus. What follows below is a brief account of the 
work now underway on the areas of current focus of the ALI 
Principles of Election Law Project: post-election dispute resolution 
processes (Part II), and non-precinct voting methods (Part III). 
II. DEVELOPING NEUTRAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESOLVING DISPUTED ELECTIONS 
The fact that American courts are now deeply involved in 
almost all matters of election administration reflects a dramatic 
change of affairs over the past half century. Yet even today, 
judicial involvement in election matters—what sometimes is 
described as a “judicialization” of politics37—still does not occur 
without some controversy. Fundamental questions include: 
When should courts get involved? What are the possible roles of 
alternative institutions? What standards should apply? How can 
courts best be insulated from the appearance of partisanship in 
electoral matters? The ALI Project is working to address these 
and other issues. 
A. Neutral Principles for Resolving Election Disputes 
The first aspiration of the ALI Principles of Election Law 
Project was to identify or develop a widely shared or emerging 
sense of what should be in a code of fair elections, particularly 
because a set of such principles might offer courts neutral 
 
 37 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 66 (2002); Russell A. Miller, Lords of Democracy: The 
Judicialization of “Pure Politics” in the United States and Germany, 61 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 587, 599 (2004); cf. Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28-32 (2004) (describing how design of democratic 
institutions has increasingly become subject of constitutional law and litigation). 
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guidance for resolving election issues. Thought of in more 
practical terms, the Project sought to facilitate a bipartisan 
agreement on certain election law fundamentals. Here, perhaps 
more than in other frontier areas that the ALI has explored or is 
exploring, it was important from the outset that the Project keep 
political realities in mind and seek a product that was both 
rigorously reasoned and practical. 
From the early stages, the Project was buoyed by the 
participation of many of the country’s best election law 
attorneys as either Advisers38 or as informal consultants.39 
These experienced lawyers candidly observed that where post-
election disputes are concerned, the set of arguments that can be 
made by a contestant is largely independent of the contestant’s 
party or ideology. Instead, the contestant’s argument depends on 
the particulars of what happened in the election. Thus, on an ex 
ante basis, partisans may have little reason to favor one set of 
electoral dispute resolution rules or institutions over another. 
For instance, one overarching issue courts face in 
election disputes is whether to require strict compliance with 
the electoral code to ensure the election’s integrity or instead 
accept substantial compliance if doing so would enfranchise 
more voters and protect their rights to vote.40 This issue can be 
found in some variation in many election disputes tracing all the 
way back to the time of the founding,41 and it continues to 
dominate many contemporary controversies. Moreover, it is an 
issue that does not seem to have much of a partisan or 
ideological cast to it. For instance, Republican candidate George 
Bush argued for a strict application of Florida law during the 
2000 presidential contest,42 whereas Democratic candidate Al 
Franken argued for a strict construction of Minnesota law 
during his 2008 senate race.43 
Of course, once a particular dispute comes before a court, 
the choice between strict versus substantial compliance may 
have an obvious and known impact on the outcome of the 
 
 38 For a list of Advisers, see Current Projects: Principles of Election Law, 
A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.members&projectid=24 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
 39 These informal consultants include a number of election administrators, as 
well as additional election lawyers, who have offered input to the project at various 
working group meetings or in response to specific requests for advice from the Reporters. 
 40 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 75-
76 n.24 (2009). 
 41 See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 14. 
 42 See id. at 45. 
 43 See Edward B. Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 
2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129, 142 (2011). 
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dispute. But before any given controversy arises, the choice 
between strict and substantial compliance could be made 
neutrally, with an eye only to promoting a system of election 
administration that is fair and reliable. The ALI Project thus is 
in a position to recommend, on an ex ante basis that draws upon 
input from the election law community, the circumstances in 
which strict compliance is appropriate and those in which 
substantial compliance instead is preferable. 
The answer to this question sometimes may vary 
depending on the nature of the noncompliance. In particular, while 
some requirements may always be necessary, others may be 
desirable but not necessary, especially if the noncompliance results 
from the error of a voting official rather than an individual voter. 
Here, a concept of “constructive compliance” might play a role. This 
concept would be applicable in circumstances in which voters who 
follow official direction are led into some degree of noncompliance 
with a formal requirement, as when poll workers, for instance, 
erroneously direct a voter to cast a wrong precinct ballot. 
Obviously, developing rules or principles for determining 
what requirements can be complied with “constructively,” rather 
than strictly, is a complex enterprise. So too is the task of deciding 
ex ante how to distinguish between those aspects of election 
administration that do and do not require strict compliance to 
ensure the integrity of the electoral process. But Project efforts to 
date suggest that these undertakings have promise. 
One complication has emerged, however, in the effort to 
develop neutral principles for resolving disputed elections. As 
noted above, a predicate of our work in this area has been the 
assumption, reinforced by the experience of many election lawyers, 
that candidates and parties had little reason in advance of a 
particular election controversy to favor one set of dispute-resolution 
principles over another. Any candidate, the assumption held, could 
end up slightly behind in the preliminary count and seek to reverse 
that count through a judicial contest. But some recent empirical 
work now suggests that in an era of widespread provisional 
balloting this traditional view may no longer be accurate.44 
The dramatic increase in the use of provisional ballots 
occasioned by the Help America Vote Act of 200245 now means 
that there are many more ballots for candidates to fight over as 
part of an election contest. Furthermore, for reasons better 
 
 44 See Edward B. Foley, A Big Blue Shift: Measuring an Asymmetrically 
Increasing Margin of Litigation, 28 J. L. & POL. 501 (2013). 
 45 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 
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explored elsewhere, provisional ballots as a rule have tended to 
favor Democratic candidates.46 Today, a Democratic candidate 
may expect to make up much more ground than a Republican 
candidate during the period between Election Day and the 
completion of the official canvass.47 Although it is still too early to 
know how this dynamic may affect the way that election 
contests play out, it is certainly possible that this phenomenon 
may cause the two major political parties to consistently deploy 
different sets of arguments during election contests. This 
asymmetry would mark a departure from the two parties’ 
historical practice of relying equally on whichever argument 
best fit their need in a particular case. 
If political parties begin to consistently favor certain 
arguments in contested elections, it perhaps could complicate the 
Project’s ability to develop a widespread ex ante consensus about 
the appropriate principles for resolving these cases. On the other 
hand, it is also conceivable that concern about how provisional 
ballots may cause a disequilibrium in the canvassing process 
might cause both sides, perhaps for different reasons, to seek 
reforms that could reduce the potential “wild card” effect of 
provisional ballots.48 In any event, we remain hopeful that 
individuals working together in good faith will still be able to 
agree upon some core set of neutral principles. And even if the 
apparent Democratic advantage in provisional ballots 
complicates the effort to develop neutral principles for 
resolving disputed elections ex ante,49 several other avenues for 
improving dispute resolution processes also are under 
consideration by the ALI Project. 
 
 46 See Edward B. Foley, Thinking about Some Possible Ohio Numbers, 
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Nov. 6, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
comments/index.php?ID=10135. 
 47 See Foley, A Big Blue Shift, supra note 44. 
 48 Republicans might seek to reduce the role of provisional ballots because of 
a concern that Democrats may net extra votes from these ballots. Democrats, 
conversely, might wish for changes in the electoral system that would convert 
countable provisional ballots into counted regular ballots, so that they do not need to 
rely on come-from-behind strategies during the canvassing process. Thus, it is possible 
that even if provisional ballots have an asymmetrical effect, the two parties might see a 
win-win solution to reducing their role. (We are grateful to Rick Hasen for suggesting a 
point along these lines.) 
 49 The provisional ballot “blue shift” problem could be reduced by improved 
voter registration databases, which would reduce the need to rely on provisional 
ballots. Therefore, there may be other ways to tackle the apparent asymmetry that has 
emerged with the increased use of provisional ballots in the wake of HAVA. 
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B. Institutions for Resolving Election Disputes 
In addition to determining what principles should govern 
the resolution of disputed elections, another fundamental task 
before the ALI Project is to determine what institutions are best 
suited to perform this function. As noted above, at this country’s 
founding, it was far from accepted that this role would devolve 
upon courts.50 Instead, legislative institutions had traditionally 
played the central role in resolving election disputes.51 But 
reliance on an elected body hardly seems to be a “neutral” 
approach. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s intervention in the 2000 
presidential election is sometimes defended as having been 
preferable to leaving it to Congress to decide the winner.52 
Yet judicial resolution has also sometimes been 
problematic. As courts have become increasingly involved in 
adjudicating election contests, the result has not always been that 
their decisions have inspired public confidence in the fairness of 
the result. Instead, courts have been sullied as another “political” 
institution.53 It has become all too common in elections for the 
winners and their supporters to believe that the election was the 
result of a fair process while the losers and their supporters 
grouse that the system was rigged or at least biased. This 
grousing can extend to federal and state courts adjudicating 
election controversies, and it is only fueled when appellate courts 
decide an election law matter along partisan or ideological lines.54 
It is not a healthy thing for a democracy when its courts 
are seen as biased toward a political party or ideology. 
Accordingly, the ALI Project is seeking to identify the best 
tribunals for resolving election disputes and how they can be 
shaped to minimize even the appearance of bias and maximize 
the public acceptance of their decisions. This undertaking is 
primarily an institutional design project, but, to a lesser extent, it 
is also an institutional culture project. 
As a matter of institutional design, the primary question 
is whether to use regular courts or instead turn to special courts 
to handle election contests. The involvement of regular courts in 
election matters may be most familiar to many Americans. This 
 
 50 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
 51 See Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, supra note 25, at 321-22. 
 52 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 92-149 (2001). 
 53 See Steven F. Huefner, What Can the United States Learn from Abroad 
about Resolving Disputed Elections?, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 543-44 
(2010); Ferejohn, supra note 37, at 66. 
 54 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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familiarity primarily stems from the 2000 presidential election, in 
which the Florida judiciary, including its Supreme Court,55 and 
the federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court,56 played 
determinative roles. But many other examples also exist, 
including the resolution of the Washington State 2004 
gubernatorial election by a state trial court.57 
Special election courts may be less familiar to many 
Americans, even though they already exist in many states. The 
2008 Minnesota Senate election stands as the most prominent 
recent example of a special court handling an election dispute. 
There, a three-judge trial court appointed from within the state’s 
existing judiciary resolved the contested Senate election.58 
Notably, Minnesota had paved the way for its 2008 contest 
through its use of a special tribunal appointed to resolve a 
contested gubernatorial election in 1962.59 
Of course, many variations could exist in the manner of 
appointing or empaneling a special election court.60 Depending on 
this selection mechanism, a special court may be better able to 
avoid the appearance of judicial politicization of the election 
outcome. This biased appearance can be avoided, for instance, if 
the members of the tribunal are already highly respected for their 
fairness and impartiality and are able to agree upon a unanimous 
resolution of the contest.61 As a matter of institutional design, the 
challenge for the ALI Project therefore is to develop acceptable 
models of special tribunals that will promote both fairness and 
impartiality. The costs and benefits of these models can then also 
be compared with regular courts. 
The effort to design a special election court may also 
produce insights into how regular courts might be best deployed 
to handle election disputes. For instance, if certain procedural 
requirements or constraints on the conduct of a special court are 
thought to facilitate unanimous decisions, similar requirements 
or constraints might be adopted for regular courts in election 
contests. Moreover, the simple recognition of the tremendous 
 
 55 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
 56 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 57 See Transcript of Oral Decision, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 2005), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
litigation/washington.php. 
 58 See Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 43, at 146-47. 
 59 See RONALD F. STINNETT & CHARLES H. BECKSTROM, RECOUNT 1 (1964). 
 60 See Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal 
for Disputed Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 488-91, 508-
09 (2010); Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 378-80 (2007). 
 61 See Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 60, at 488-91. 
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significance of reaching a unanimous decision in an election 
contest may itself help promote an institutional culture of 
working assiduously to reach unanimity whenever possible. 
In that regard, it bears noting that the National Center 
for State Courts, in conjunction with the Election Law Program 
at William and Mary Law School, now has its own project 
underway to encourage members of each state’s judiciary to 
consider the challenges of resolving election issues in court.62 
The Center is conducting this project primarily through a series 
of “war game” scenarios at state judiciary conferences in which a 
hypothetical election contest is argued before a panel of judges 
in front of an audience of other judges. After the panel 
announces its decision, a moderated discussion then explores 
the hypothetical problem as well as larger issues that may 
arise in handling election disputes.63 By increasing awareness 
and inviting judges to think ahead about some of the particular 
challenges inherent in election contests, these and comparable 
exercises also have the potential to change institutional culture 
with respect to the adjudication of election law matters. 
C. Timeframe for Resolving Election Disputes 
One discrete but thorny challenge in most post-election 
disputes is how to resolve the dispute expeditiously. The 
political calendar inevitably imposes some deadline, usually a 
quick one. Meeting this deadline can be a problem in an 
election contest. 
Famously, the 2000 presidential election ended after 
five weeks of wrangling because the U.S. Supreme Court, 
holding that Florida’s ballot recounting processes violated the 
equal protection clause, also presumed that Florida did not 
intend for its state election contest process to extend beyond 
the “safe harbor” deadline under the federal Electoral Count 
Act.64 The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the election was 
over because, by the time the Court reached its final decision, 
that safe harbor deadline had arrived.65 In contrast, the 2008 
Minnesota Senate contest did not officially end until July 2009, 
 
 62 See Brian Kelley, May 16 Court Simulation to Test Principles of Election 
Law, WM. & MARY L. SCH. NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://law.wm.edu/news/stories/2012/
election-litigation.php. 
 63 Each of the authors of this essay has served as an advisor and 
commentator on these “war game” exercises. 
 64 See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
 65 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000). 
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some eight months after Election Day and six months after the 
winning senator should have taken his seat in Congress.66 
The timeframe problem also may merit attention as a 
matter of both institutional design and institutional culture. As 
a matter of culture, it is important to alert institutions to the 
need for expedition and to invite them to think ahead about 
how to manage this problem. Successful management likely 
will require both advance planning and some multitasking of 
judicial processes and issues, potentially including having 
multiple bodies or tribunals working concurrently.67 
Unfortunately, in many states the existing post-election 
calendar simply will not permit timely resolution of a 
complicated electoral dispute, typically because the canvassing 
process is structured over several weeks or more.68 As a result, 
no amount of advance planning or multitasking in these states 
will facilitate the timely resolution of a presidential election 
dispute before the safe harbor deadline. This is a nightmare 
waiting to happen. 
Of course, the timeframe problem also can be addressed 
as a matter of institutional design (or re-design). To this end, 
the ALI Project has already developed a set of draft model 
calendars—a shorter one for a disputed presidential election and 
a slightly longer one for other races.69 The presidential election 
calendar compresses the post-election steps of canvass, recount, 
contest, and appeal into the five weeks between Election Day 
and the safe harbor date. For non-presidential races, a nine-
week version schedules these steps to all occur before early 
January, when the terms of most offices on the November ballot 
are scheduled to begin. (The nine-week calendar could also be 
used in future presidential elections, provided Congress 
adjusted the dates associated with the Electoral College.) 
These are incredibly tight calendars that cannot be 
effectively followed without substantial advance planning and 
multitasking. Moreover, some states will not be able to adhere to 
these expedited calendars without adjusting their existing 
deadlines for their regular post-election canvassing processes. 
 
 66 See Coleman v. Franken (In re Contest of General Election), 767 N.W.2d 
453, 456 (Minn. 2009). 
 67 See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION LAW: RESOLUTION OF ELECTION 
DISPUTES 1-12 (Discussion Draft Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www.ali.org/
00021333/Election_Law__report%20-%20online.pdf. 
 68 See Edward B. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v. 
Franken, 10 ELECTION L.J. 187, 196-98 & n.31 (2011). 
 69 See PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION LAW, supra note 67, at 1, 7. 
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But the ALI Principles of Election Law Project has developed 
these calendars as a guide for how best to use the limited time 
available to resolve an election dispute and generate a fair and 
expedited result. Absent the unlikely addition of more time 
between Election Day and the date when a final result should be 
in hand (at least not beyond the nine-weeks from Election Day 
in early November to the beginning of most terms of office in 
early January), the ALI’s proposal presents the optimal 
response to the timeframe problem. 
However, the prospects for the model calendars may be 
affected by the possibility that Democratic candidates stand to 
gain more from provisional ballots.70 To the extent that a post-
election dispute is primarily over the counting of provisional 
ballots, Democrats may be more likely to benefit from—and thus 
to support—the development of a calendar better suited to a fair 
and expeditious resolution of election contests.71 Nevertheless, in 
the abstract, a well-designed process for expediting the resolution 
of an election dispute can be politically neutral and capable of 
promoting the fair adjudication of whatever issues happen to be 
at stake in any given election. It therefore will certainly be 
disappointing if partisan calculations interfere with the adoption 
of the best timetable for handling a post-election contest. 
III. WIDESPREAD IMPLEMENTATION OF NON-PRECINCT 
VOTING METHODS 
Inevitably, the effort to improve the resolution of post-
election disputes appropriately leads to considering ideas for 
reducing the number and complexity of issues that could be fought 
over post-election. Among other issues, these “pressure points” 
include not only provisional balloting (as previously noted72), but 
also absentee balloting (which was the focus of the 2008 Minnesota 
Senate contest73). More generally, to the extent that the pre-
election and Election Day processes can be made to run more 
 
 70 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
 71 In both Washington in 2004 and Minnesota in 2008, however, it was the 
Democrat who received the certification of electoral victory after the completion of an 
administrative recount, and thus it was the Republican who went to court in January 
with the clock ticking while the dispute remained pending. In Minnesota, the office 
remained vacant, so both sides had an incentive to complete the litigation quickly—
although the incentive was complicated by the political makeup of the U.S. Senate: The 
Republicans wanted to prevent the Democrats from getting one more vote for a 
filibuster-proof 60 members, whereas adding one more Republican compared to 
keeping the seat vacant arguably did not make a difference. 
 72 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 43, at 147-55. 
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smoothly, it will also be easier to determine the winners, and post-
election disputes can be minimized or eliminated. 
Of course, some reform ideas, like permitting Election 
Day registration or imposing a mandatory photo identification 
requirement on voters, are contentious and tend to divide 
proponents and opponents along party lines.74 In contrast, one 
recent trend with bipartisan support has been the rapid 
expansion in both early in-person voting and no-excuse absentee 
voting.75 This trend is the result of efforts to increase voter 
convenience and to ease Election Day burdens on election 
administrators, for instance by reducing the long lines of voters 
at some polling locations in recent presidential elections.76 But 
the advent and growth of “convenience voting” also has 
introduced new potential concerns. 
With an eye toward helping election jurisdictions best 
capitalize on the recent dramatic increases in early and 
absentee voting, the ALI Principles of Election Law Project has 
undertaken a second area of focus, apart from the processes for 
resolving a disputed election. In this second area, the Project 
seeks to serve voters and election administrators alike, as well as 
candidates in close or disputed races, by identifying best practices 
for non-precinct-based voting methods.77 After briefly describing 
the nature of the trend toward convenience voting and its primary 
impacts on voters, this part discusses some of the responses to 
this trend that the ALI Project is developing. 
A. The Recent Expansion of Non-Precinct Voting 
Until recently, for most Americans the act of voting 
occurred on Election Day in a voter’s assigned home precinct. 
Voters with disabilities or who knew in advance that they would 
be absent from their home precinct on Election Day could 
request an absentee ballot, which they might either return by 
mail or drop off in person at election headquarters. As of 20 
years ago, the percentage of voters casting a ballot before 
 
 74 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Paul Gronke & Daniel P. Tokaji, The Party Line, 10 ELECTION L.J. 71, 
71 (2011). However, as discussed below, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text, 
the extent of the availability of early voting is now under some partisan pressure. 
 76 See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting 
in Florida in the Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331, 333 (2012) (describing 
Florida’s 2004 early voting legislation as “viewed by Republican and Democratic lawmakers 
alike as a practical way to reduce Election Day mishaps at the polls”). 
 77 See ALI Council Approves New Project on Election Law, supra note 34. 
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Election Day remained in the single digits.78 Today, however, 
more than 30% of all votes in a presidential election are cast 
outside the precinct polling place before Election Day.79 
In part, this shift reflects the decisions of states like 
Washington and Oregon to conduct their elections entirely by 
mail.80 Of course, in these jurisdictions 100% of the voters now 
vote without going to their precinct on Election Day. But the 
national figures are driven much more by the decisions of other 
states to permit any voter, not just the disabled and those who 
will be absent on Election Day, to either cast an absentee ballot 
by mail or to visit a voting center in the days or weeks before 
Election Day. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia 
now give voters at least one of these options, and many of these 
states offer voters both choices.81 
These two options are not equal, however, in terms of 
their convenience to voters, their reduction of the burdens on 
election administrators, or their potential impact on election 
disputes. For instance, mail-in absentee voting arguably 
provides voters the most convenience,82 but it creates greater 
vulnerabilities, as discussed below.83 Meanwhile, early in-person 
voting is generally more secure, but at least in some locations it 
may impose greater public expense or may generate long lines.84 
Moreover, if these alternative voting options are perceived as 
having disparate impacts on partisan interests, then efforts to 
establish best practices will inevitably be more complicated. 
Finally, once these options have been made available to voters, it 
 
 78 See Michael P. McDonald, Early Voting in 2012: What to Expect, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/early-voting-in-
2012-what_b_1773768.html. 
 79 See Michael P. McDonald, A Modest Early Voting Rise in 2012, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald/a-modest-early-
voting-ris_b_3430379.html. 
 80 See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 28, 2013), 
www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2013). 
 81 See id. 
 82 See, e.g., WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, WASHINGTON STATE’S VOTE-BY-MAIL 
EXPERIENCE (2007), available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/documentvault/
WashingtonStatesVotebyMailExperienceOctober2007-2066.pdf. 
 83 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
 84 See Luke Johnson, Ohio Early Voting: Long Lines Reported Outside Polling 
Places, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/04/
ohio-early-voting_n_2073287.html; Long Lines for Early Voting Before Tuesday’s 
Election, CNN (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/politics/election-voting; 
see also ADAM HARVELL & EDWARD EDNEY, AN EXAMINATION OF EARLY VOTING IN 
WISCONSIN 1, 6 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
publication/65/early_voting_report_final_pdf_25757.pdf. 
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may be hard to scale them back, even if doing so might improve 
the overall system of election administration. 
From the standpoint of sound election administration, 
early in-person voting is vastly preferable to mail-in absentee 
voting for at least four reasons, all related to the integrity of 
the election. First, because mail-in absentee ballots are cast 
outside the presence of official election workers, the potential 
for outright fraud is significantly greater than with in-person 
voting. In theory, this fraud could include individual voters 
selling their ballots to others. An additional risk is that a group 
of absentee ballots is deliberately misdirected or intercepted.85 
Second, because absentee ballots are cast outside the 
presence of election officials, it also is not only possible but 
almost inevitable that some voters will mark their ballots in 
the presence and therefore under the influence of family, 
friends, or others whose wishes or expectations a voter may 
desire to accommodate, even subconsciously.86 Voting at the 
voting booth on Election Day, done privately and in secret, does 
not permit this. The risk of outside influence on the absentee 
voter exists whether the improper influence is deliberate or 
inadvertent, coercive or voluntary. Avoiding these risks was 
one of the reasons that the United States adopted a secret 
ballot for most voters in the late nineteenth century.87 
Third, voters casting a mail-in ballot generally will not 
be notified if they have spoiled their ballot by voting for too 
many candidates in a given race. Nor will they be alerted if they 
inadvertently neglected to make a choice in a particular race. 
These “residual votes”88 often may be enough to affect the 
outcome of a close election, and their existence means that some 
voters are effectively disenfranchised. In contrast, voters casting 
a ballot at a polling place can be notified of residual vote issues, 
and, if they wish, they may be able to correct their ballot. As a 
 
 85 See, e.g., In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 
4, 1997 Election for Miami, Fla., 707 So. 2d 1170, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(disqualifying all absentee ballots in mayoral election because of demonstrated fraud 
concerning some of the ballots). 
 86 For instance, in the 2005 Detroit mayoral election, some absentee voters 
were “advised” how to vote by paid ambassadors of the city clerk. See HUEFNER, FOLEY 
& TOKAJI, supra note 1, at 96-97. 
 87 See John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret 
Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 486-91 (2003). 
 88 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and 
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1755 (2005). 
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result, the residual vote rate for in-person voting is significantly 
lower than it is for mail-in voting.89 
Fourth, voters casting a mail-in ballot may be entirely 
disenfranchised, not by a residual voting problem, but by a 
mistake or error in completing their ballot transmission 
envelope or accompanying affidavit. If election officials conclude 
that a ballot does not satisfy the authentication requirements of 
the jurisdiction’s mail-in voting process, the entire ballot may be 
rejected.90 Ideally, jurisdictions should have some error 
correction process for this circumstance. But many do not, and 
even those that do likely will not see all affected voters 
properly correct their mail-in ballots. Voting in person 
eliminates this problem (except for voters required to cast a 
provisional ballot) because the authentication processes are all 
conducted in real time between the voter and the election 
official. Once the voter is given the ballot (or escorted to a 
voting machine), the voter can be confident that the voter’s 
marked ballot will be counted. 
Of course, mail-in voting offers voters significant 
convenience, both in terms of the ability to vote from home and 
the ability to ponder the ballot over an extended period before 
making a final decision.91 Voting by mail also may provide 
election jurisdictions with real cost savings, whereas in-person 
early voting may add costs, depending on how much it reduces the 
expense of running Election Day operations.92 Moreover, the fact 
that Washington and Oregon now vote entirely by mail may lead 
many people to view mail-in voting as relatively secure. But the 
reality may be that mail-in voting is more convenient and 
inexpensive than it is secure. Nevertheless, it may not be realistic 
 
 89 See Voting By Mail: An Examination of State and Local Experiences: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 111th Cong. 11-12 (May 5, 2010) (Prepared 
statement of John C. Fortier, Dir. of the Democracy Project, Bipartisan Policy Ctr.), 
available at http://www.aei.org/files/2010/05/05/FortierTestimony051010.pdf; Charles 
Stewart III, Adding Up the Costs and Benefits of Voting by Mail, 10 ELECTION L.J. 297, 300 
(2011); Daniel Tokaji, Voting Technology: The Way Forward, AM. U. CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY & ELECTION MGMT. (2006), http://www.american.edu/spa/cdem/upload/6-
Voting_Technology_Dan_Tokaji.pdf. 
 90 That is what happened in the Minnesota 2008 Senate contest. See Foley, 
The Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 43, at 147-50. 
 91 Voters of course can do this with any voting method by reviewing a sample 
ballot at leisure before marking their actual ballot, but the lived experience of many 
voters is that having the absentee ballot in hand facilitates this in a meaningful way. 
See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 82, at 1-3. 
 92 Determining the cost implications is complicated, making it hard to 
generalize. See Voting By Mail: An Examination of State and Local Experiences, supra 
note 89, at 8-9. 
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to expect states that already offer no-excuse absentee voting to 
eliminate this option now that voters are using it extensively. 
The ALI Principles of Election Law Project thus is in a 
prime position to make a contribution with respect to non-
precinct voting. In some states, ALI principles can influence 
substantive choices that have yet to be made. Meanwhile, in those 
states where some of the substantive choices have already been 
made, there is still some momentum to be harnessed or directed 
to shape future refinements, particularly in light of additional 
information about various means of non-precinct voting. The 
challenge for the Project is to identify the most helpful 
principles in light of empirical data, sound administration, 
existing practice, and political realities. 
B. Some Potential Responses 
In the face of the dramatic increase in non-precinct 
“convenience” voting options over the past decade, one threshold 
question for the ALI Project is whether to advocate for any 
particular method of non-precinct voting. Given the extent to 
which many states have already committed to one or more types 
of non-precinct voting, the Project has contemplated remaining 
neutral with respect to the various alternatives while 
simultaneously working to develop principles for the best 
deployment of each of them. 
At the same time, in-person voting offers substantial 
advantages, as discussed above.93 It seems valuable to go on 
record about these advantages, even if primarily for the benefit 
of only those jurisdictions that have yet to move to some non-
precinct alternative. Moreover, alerting the legal and 
legislative communities to the advantages of in-person voting 
also could influence the development of refinements to mail-in 
voting processes, such as the incorporation of opportunities for 
voters to correct errors in their ballot transmission materials, 
or the deployment of new measures to discourage or detect 
mail-in ballot fraud. 
Beyond merely describing the comparative advantages 
of mail-in and early in-person voting, the ALI Principles of 
Election Law Project can also be helpful by identifying best 
practices for both absentee voting and early in-person voting. 
The final product of the Project, therefore, is likely to address a 
number of elements of these processes, including such topics as: 
 
 93 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
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the appropriate duration of early voting or mail-in voting periods, 
where and how to site early voting centers, the authentication 
requirements for absentee ballots, and the methods for voters to 
correct deficiencies in their ballot transmission materials. But for 
present purposes, this article will describe in greater detail only 
the effort to develop a response to the question of whether to 
permit early in-person voting on the final weekend before 
Election Day. 
Specifying the ideal period of early in-person voting turns 
out to be complicated. It is influenced by a variety of demographic 
and other factors, including the number of registered voters, 
population density, availability of suitable early voting locations, 
transportation options, local economic conditions and work 
routines, and other norms of behavior. That said, the ALI 
Project has identified two critical principles to help establish 
the duration of early in-person voting. 
First, a jurisdiction that chooses to offer early in-person 
voting should make sure that the option is conveniently available 
to the vast majority of voters on an equal basis. Thus, for 
instance, it would not be appropriate to offer early voting only 
during the lunch hour on weekdays. Instead, a variety of times 
and days, including evenings and weekends, should be part of the 
early voting regimen. Furthermore, to best serve the most 
voters, it would seem important to include more than one 
weekend in the early voting period. 
Second, in establishing a variety of early voting 
opportunities, a jurisdiction should be careful not to begin the 
early voting window too soon. A relatively short voting window 
will ensure that voters cast their ballots on the basis of common 
knowledge, including even last-minute changes in candidacies or 
other late-breaking news. Although many jurisdictions have a 
practice of allowing mail-in voting to begin a month or more 
before Election Day,94 and although federal law now requires 
overseas and military voters’ ballots to be mailed 45 days in 
advance,95 it is not generally advisable to allow voters to vote 
across a wide time gap except for purposes of mail delivery to 
remote voters. Instead, voting across a relatively short period 
better promotes collective decision making on the basis of 
shared information. 
 
 94 Early Voting Calendar, 2012, EARLY VOTING INFO. CTR., 
http://reed.edu/earlyvoting/calendar/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
 95 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a)(8) (2012). 
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In combination, these two principles lead naturally to 
the conclusion that the period of early in-person voting should 
include the final weekend before Election Day. In the 2008 
presidential election, a number of jurisdictions agreed and 
permitted early in-person voting on both the final Saturday and 
Sunday.96 However, some of these jurisdictions then decided to 
eliminate this final weekend of voting in the 2012 presidential 
election.97 The primary justification for this change was to 
permit election officials to devote these days to Election Day 
preparation.98 But the extent to which this was a true priority 
for election officials was never clear, and some observers saw an 
ulterior, partisan motive.99 
Specifically, many perceived that the final weekend of 
early voting in the 2012 national election would favor 
Democratic candidates—at least in some (swing) states—
because Democratic turnout on the final Sunday of the 2008 
presidential election had been heavy in those states.100 Prior to 
the 2008 election, the accepted wisdom had been that providing 
voters with additional absentee or early voting opportunities 
did not increase voter turnout but rather only provided 
increased convenience to voters who would have otherwise 
voted anyway.101 Some data from 2008 seemed to suggest 
otherwise, however, and so some saw the elimination of early 
voting on the final weekend of the 2012 election as an effort to 
shape who voted, not just how they voted.102 
The bottom line is that even with respect to an issue 
like the appropriate days of early in-person voting, the 
 
 96 See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Why the Ohio Early Voting Case is Not a 
Threat to Military Voting Accommodations, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 1, 3-5 & 
n.11 (2013) (describing Ohio’s 2008 early voting options), available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/04/Furthermore.Hueffner.pdf; 
see also Herron & Smith, supra note 76, at 333-34 (describing Florida’s 2008 early 
voting options). 
 97 See, e.g., Herron & Smith, supra note 76, at 334-35 (describing the Florida 
legislature’s elimination of final Sunday voting in 2012); Huefner, Why the Ohio Early 
Voting Case is Not a Threat to Military Voting Accommodations, supra note 96, at 3-5 
(describing the Ohio legislature’s elimination of final weekend voting in 2012); WEISER 
& NORDEN, supra note 6, at 29-30 (summarizing early voting changes around the 
country for 2012). 
 98 See Herron & Smith, supra note 76, at 334-35. 
 99 See Dan Froomkin, Republican Voter Suppression Campaign Rolls Back 
Early Voting, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/18/republican-voter-suppression-early-voting_n_1766172.html; Herron & 
Smith, supra note 76, at 335. 
 100 See WEISER & NORDEN, supra note 6, at 33. 
 101 See id. at 29; see also R. Michael Alvarez et al., Making Voting Easier: 
Convenience Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election, 65 POL. RES. Q. 248 (2012). 
 102 See Froomkin, supra note 99; Herron & Smith, supra note 76, at 346. 
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Principles of Election Law Project must be aware of potential 
partisan effects and concerns. How these concerns will 
ultimately be resolved remains to be seen. Nevertheless, a few 
concluding observations are in order about how the Project is 
proceeding, particularly in light of these kinds of challenges. 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE ALI PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION LAW 
PROJECT 
The ALI launched the non-precinct voting and post-election 
dispute resolution components of its Principles of Election Law 
Project with the expectation that these two areas would more 
easily lend themselves to the development of (and agreement 
about) impartial principles than would other areas of election law. 
This expectation remains true, even though, as suggested above, 
neither one of these areas has proven completely free from 
potential partisan interests. As a result, even in these relatively 
less controversial areas, one challenge for the Project is to promote 
the establishment of a meta-law that is predicated exclusively on 
principles of fundamental fairness and sound administration, 
derived without regard to anticipated partisan impact. 
The extent to which the Project can do so will depend on 
the collective effort of its Reporters, Advisers, and many other 
interested observers. To date, these contributors have all been 
working in good faith to develop neutral principles, 
notwithstanding the fact that potential partisan effects lurk in 
the background. Although the Project is not yet at the point of 
having any official output, the draft dispute resolution calendars 
previously described,103 which incorporate input from many 
quarters, offer evidence that agreement on at least some 
significant issues of election administration can be reached. And 
even if the field of election law does not yet have a complete body 
of law to “restate,” the ALI Project might yet be able to 
contribute to something like a “Code of Fair Competition” or 
“Code of Fair Elections.” 
But now that the Project is fully underway, some 
additional questions and considerations have emerged. Indeed, 
one foundational question is just what “neutrality” even means 
with respect to principles of election law. Is it fundamentally 
different than, say, neutrality with respect to the development 
of principles of tort law or of contract law? Might neutrality 
simply be whatever would result after granting the major 
 
 103 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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political parties equal status and bargaining power in a process 
of seeking principles to which the parties could agree? Or is 
neutrality something more than that, something derivable from 
basic notions of representational fairness and due process? 
This central question of what constitutes neutrality for 
purposes of election law exists in the shadow of the fact that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s electoral due process and equal 
protection standards are themselves still quite woolly. Neglected 
for years as a result of the invocation of the political question 
doctrine, these constitutional standards remain relatively 
unelaborated where electoral processes are concerned.104 There 
simply is not an established measure of what is fair or neutral with 
respect to matters of election law.105 The ALI Project labors within 
this nebulous domain. Hopefully, the Project’s contributions can 
add clarity to this underdeveloped area of the law. 
Furthermore, even if there were an established measure of 
electoral fairness, the subsidiary question of how to achieve it 
would remain. Thus, a second crucial consideration for the ALI 
Project is what its real-world impact should be. One key issue is 
how to balance the potentially competing values of the normative 
fairness of a principle with its practical acceptance or enactability. 
Indeed, a full-blown Code of Fair Elections would likely stand 
little chance of being adopted in most state legislatures. 
Here, it would seem worth sacrificing some degree of 
normative perfection in order to actually get something 
adopted. As Larry Zelenak, elsewhere in this symposium, aptly 
quoted ALI President Tweed concerning the ALI’s 1954 Tax 
project, “[a]nything that is accomplished will be worthwhile” 
given the starting point.106 The critical thing is to advance the ball 
by getting something done. Accordingly, the enactability or 
acceptability of various potential electoral reforms will inevitably 
influence the output of the Project. But just how much normative 
fairness is worth trading in order to achieve a practical impact is 
a highly subjective question. 
Finally, a third issue for the ALI Project is whether to 
seek some additional federalization of election law. Given the 
likely difficulty of getting individual states to enact what could be 
a relatively cerebral, normatively heavy Code of Fair Elections, it 
 
 104 See Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, supra note 29. 
 105 Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election 
Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004) (describing 
doctrinal difficulties in field of election law). 
 106 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Almost-Restatement of Income Tax of 1954: 
When Tax Giants Roamed the Earth, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 709, 714 (2014). 
2014] RESTATEMENT OF ELECTION LAW 577 
 
is worth seriously considering what elements of such a Code 
might generate a favorable response in Congress, especially in 
discrete components.107 If state legislatures were encouraged to 
adopt whatever more practical (and politically agreeable) 
compromises the state’s political leaders would embrace, a 
targeted congressional enactment of certain other principles 
might fill in some of the gaps separating the more pragmatic 
state-level reforms and a more idealized Code of Fair Elections 
(assuming, of course, that Congress could be moved to act). 
CONCLUSION 
In short, in addition to its two-fold effort to improve the 
resolution of post-election disputes and propound best practices 
for non-precinct voting, the ALI Principles of Election Law 
Project also wrestles with several additional interesting issues. 
These additional issues include: How to identify and promote 
fair election principles in the face of partisan interests? What is 
“neutrality” in this context? How much relative weight should 
the Project give to the goal of enactability versus the ideal of 
normative fairness? And should some components of what 
might be in a Code of Fair Elections be pursued as a matter of 
federal rather than state law? The Project will continue 
exploring these issues as it moves forward. 
Meanwhile, the problem of partisanship in structuring 
election laws remains a real concern. Indeed, excessive 
partisanship may be the primary obstacle to fair elections. But if 
so, what is to be done? One parting suggestion (in addition to 
continuing to stress to those in power the critical importance of 
setting aside partisan concerns and making meta-law decisions on 
the basis of fundamental fairness rather than anticipated political 
effects) is more broadly to consider the efficacy of developing new 
institutions—not just new rules or principles of election law—for 
all or many aspects of structuring and conducting elections. The 
discussion above has already briefly mentioned the possibility of 
developing new institutions for resolving disputed elections.108 As 
an extension of that idea, and in a way that could be uniquely 
possible in the field of election law (as contrasted with the fields of 
torts or contracts, for example, where the roles of courts and 
 
 107 For instance, one discrete federal measure could be an amendment targeted 
solely at adjusting the timeline of the Electoral Count Act. See Steven F. Huefner, Reforming 
the Timetable for the Electoral College Process, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Nov. 30, 2004), 
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legislatures are relatively fixed), it may be that the institutions 
responsible for developing and implementing the rules and 
principles of election law could also be reimagined.109 Both for the 
ALI Principles of Election Law Project, and for reformers generally, 
it is worthwhile to remain open to the potential of this more 




 109 See, e.g., Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, supra note 7 (exploring 
the possibility of separate electoral institutions); Huefner, What Can the United States 
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